Maybe later. Right now we’re peeling something a bit deeper than tangerines.

I agree that all opinions are subjective.

So saying ‘that’s just subjective’ doesn’t really add much, and that makes sense to me.

But at the same time, people often treat ‘not objective’ as if it means ‘not correct,’ don’t they?

That’s what feels a bit strange to me. If everything is subjective, then where does that standard even come from?

Personally, I don’t think it’s about subjectivity being more important, but rather about how different subjective perspectives relate to each other and sometimes align.

I think a lot of people see it that way, and I get what you mean.

But I’ve been thinking about defining “subjective” a bit differently — not just as consciousness or perception.

I don’t think we can simply assume that objective reality exists independently as a given.

What you’re calling “independently measurable facts” already presupposes a structure that makes measurement possible. Measurement doesn’t occur in a vacuum — it only happens within a specific observational framework.

From that perspective, objectivity is not something free from subjectivity. It emerges when different observational structures align and produce stable results.

What we call “objective” is just what remains consistent across observers — not something that exists without them.

So rather than being more true, objectivity is better understood as a stabilized and shareable form of coherence.

That’s a really clear way to distinguish them, and I agree that confusion happens when subjective statements are treated as objective facts.

But from a different perspective, what we call “objective” might not be something independent of subjectivity in the first place.

In the SIEP framework, reality isn’t something that exists fully formed and then gets described. It emerges when a deeper layer of subjectivity (Absolute Subjectivity) intersects with an observer’s frame (Relative Subjectivity), and only becomes “fixed” when coherence is achieved.

So what we call “objective facts” are actually stabilized results of this coherence process, rather than something fundamentally separate from subjectivity.

In that sense, the issue isn’t that subjective statements become problematic when treated as objective — but that we’re already inside a system where the “objective” itself is generated through structured subjectivity.

That makes sense — I think that’s a very common way to see it.

But then I have a question: why is “objective” treated as something superior or more correct?

I largely agree with your position that finding an objective reality in a strict sense is difficult.

Your example of “games” is particularly interesting, and I think it clearly shows how definitions fail to be absolute, yet still allow for practical agreement.

However, I would like to propose a slight shift in perspective.

At this point, I think it may be necessary to reconsider what we mean by an “observer” in the first place.

In many discussions, the observer is treated as something already given — as if it were a fixed entity that simply accesses reality.

But what if that assumption itself is part of the problem?

If every access to reality is mediated by an observer, then the structure of the observer cannot be taken for granted.

It might be that the difficulty in defining objective reality is not just about the object, but about how the observer itself is constituted.

In that sense, the separation between observer and observed may not be fundamental, but emergent from a deeper structure.

Since I already shared that paper earlier, let me just highlight the specific point I find relevant here:

it does not treat the observer as a given entity, but rather as something that is itself constructed within the act of observation.

That helps clarify your position—thank you.

If I understand correctly, you’re saying that mathematics itself constitutes an objective reality, and that our access to it is not dependent on subjective observation.

What I’m still trying to understand is this:

what would it mean, concretely, for access to occur “nonsubjectively”?

Even when engaging with mathematics, it seems that any recognition, manipulation, or understanding still takes place through some form of subject.

So I’m wondering whether the question is not just about whether something is objective, but about whether the very notion of “access” can ever be separated from the structure of subjectivity in the first place.

Maybe—but I’m not trying to rehearse Hegel. I’m asking what “independent of observation” actually means if every possible access is already mediated through a subject. At what point does that assumption stop doing real work?

I think I agree with you there — for most people, everyday reality is strongly shaped by what actually works and is present in a practical sense.

But that’s also what makes it interesting to me.

Because for something to “work” consistently in that way, it has to produce similar results across many different people and situations.

So it’s not just that it works — it works for multiple observers in a compatible way.

From that perspective, what we call “reality” might not just be about what is present or functional, but about what remains stable when different perspectives overlap.

In other words, everyday reality could be seen not just as what exists, but as what holds together across observers.

I’m actually Japanese and not very fluent in English, so I use AI to help with translation. That might be why my wording sounds a bit unnatural sometimes.

That’s a really clear way to put it — tying reality to what consistently works and can be reproduced.

But then I think there’s a deeper question underneath that.

What actually makes something reproducible in the first place?

Because reproducibility already assumes that different observers can arrive at the same result under similar conditions.

So rather than defining reality as “what works,” it might be that “what works” is actually the result of something more fundamental — a kind of consistency across observers.

If that’s the case, then reproducibility doesn’t define reality, it reflects a deeper structure that allows different perspectives to converge.

And if we only focus on what is already reproducible, we might miss the level where that consistency itself is formed.

That helps clarify your position—thank you.

If I understand correctly, you’re saying that mathematics itself constitutes an objective reality, and that our access to it is not dependent on subjective observation.

What I’m still trying to understand is this:

what would it mean, concretely, for access to occur “nonsubjectively”?

Even when engaging with mathematics, it seems that any recognition, manipulation, or understanding still takes place through some form of subject.

So I’m wondering whether the question is not just about whether something is objective, but about whether the very notion of “access” can ever be separated from the structure of subjectivity in the first place.

I largely agree with your position that finding an objective reality in a strict sense is difficult.

If anything, I think your argument about the lack of an “ideal definition” (like in the case of games) already points to something deeper: that every access to what we call “reality” is structurally mediated by a subject.

Where I would slightly extend your point is this:

it’s not just that we fail to reach an objective reality, but that the very framework we use already assumes a separation between observer and observed.

And that assumption itself might be the root of the problem.

In that sense, I also agree that most attempts to preserve “objective reality” end up relying on some form of dualism — even if implicitly.

From my perspective, this isn’t just a philosophical issue.

It may actually be connected to why modern physics has struggled for over a century to reconcile relativity and quantum theory.

Relativity treats the observer as a coordinate frame within a continuous structure, while quantum theory assigns a more active role to observation in determining states.

Both start from a separation, but develop it in incompatible ways.

So the difficulty might not lie in the theories themselves, but in the underlying assumption that observer and reality can be cleanly separated in the first place.

If you’re interested, there is a paper that approaches this issue from the level of the structure of observation itself, including some experimental work. I would be very interested to hear your thoughts if you have the time to read it at your own pace.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398757987_The_Removal_of_God_from_Knowledge_How_the_Exclusion_of_Absolute_Subjectivity_Shaped_Modern_Science_and_Its_Limits

That makes sense — I agree that without some kind of structure, it’s hard to treat something as meaningful beyond speculation.

But what about cases where there is a strong mathematical structure, even if direct observation is still missing or limited?

For example, in physics, many theories are highly constrained and mathematically consistent, yet still incomplete when it comes to observation — and this seems especially true when trying to connect quantum theory and relativity.

Some arguments suggest that this gap might not just be about missing data, but about how we define “reality” in the first place — especially if we restrict it only to what is directly observable.

The paper I shared in my previous reply suggests this might be a key issue.

Alright, I’ll share the paper with you.

I’d really appreciate hearing your thoughts on it.

I’ll also take a look at the video you shared and the theories you mentioned, and get back to you with my thoughts as well.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398757987_The_Removal_of_God_from_Knowledge_How_the_Exclusion_of_Absolute_Subjectivity_Shaped_Modern_Science_and_Its_Limits

That’s an interesting position — focusing only on what we can observe makes things very clear and practical.

But there’s also an interesting issue that comes up from that approach.

For example, physics has struggled for over 100 years to unify relativity and quantum theory, and some arguments suggest that this difficulty may be related to restricting reality only to what is observable.

There’s a paper that explores this idea in more detail.

If you’re interested, I’d really appreciate hearing your thoughts on it.

It’s the third paper in a series.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398757987_The_Removal_of_God_from_Knowledge_How_the_Exclusion_of_Absolute_Subjectivity_Shaped_Modern_Science_and_Its_Limits

That’s a fair point — we can’t just ignore fire. It burns us whether we believe in it or not.

But I think that doesn’t fully answer the question — it actually makes it more interesting.

The real issue is not whether something feels real, but how it becomes real in the first place.

For example, “heat” only appears when a certain kind of system interacts with the world.

A different kind of observer might not experience “heat” at all, even if facing the same thing.

So maybe the question is this:

Is something “objective” because it exists completely independent of any observer,

or because different observers end up experiencing it in the same way?

If it’s the second, then “objectivity” might not mean independence — it might mean consistency across perspectives.

In that sense, the fact that fire always feels hot doesn’t prove it’s independent — it might just mean that many observers are structured in a similar way.

Do you mean that mathematics provides a way to understand or describe an objective reality?

If so, I think my question is slightly different— I’m asking about the very basis on which that “objective reality” is said to exist in the first place.

I have a sense that what you’re calling “relations” might not be entirely different from what I’m pointing to — even if the framing is different.

Not necessarily the same concept, but perhaps pointing toward something closely related.

In particular, when you describe life in terms of relational structures, I wonder if those relations could be understood not just as interactions within a system, but as something more like intersections of subjectivity.

And if we take that seriously, it might even open up a different way to think about the origin of life itself.

Instead of starting purely from relational processes, perhaps what we call “life” begins at the point where a more fundamental subjectivity and a relationally-formed subjectivity come into contact.

Not as a fixed claim, but as a possible way to reframe the question.

I’d be really interested to hear how that resonates with your perspective.

If you’re interested, I could share a paper that develops a perspective along these lines.

I’d be very curious to hear your honest thoughts on it.

That’s a very clear position, and I see why process philosophy leads you there.

If reality is fundamentally relational, then it makes sense to reject the idea of an unrelated subject.

But I’m wondering about something slightly different.

When we say that everything that exists is relational, does that also apply to the condition for relations to appear at all?

Because relations, by definition, are always between something and something. Even if those “somethings” are themselves relational, there still seems to be a minimal sense in which something must be present for any relation to occur.

I’m not suggesting a “separate entity” outside of relations, but rather questioning whether the relational framework fully accounts for its own ground.

In other words, could it be that what we call relations are not the ultimate starting point, but already a kind of manifestation of something more primitive?

I’m curious how process philosophy would respond to that.